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Essay
Laws and Codes for the Resource Curse
Paul Colliert
The international community assigns a high priority to helping impoverished
societies, yet its efforts are currently lopsided. While it spends around U.S. $
100 billion on aid and provides over 100,000 UN peacekeepers, to date it has
largely neglected the potential of international codes and laws to raise
standards of economic governance. This Essay analyzes the potential
contribution of such codes and laws to increase the development impact of
natural resource revenues. The current commodity booms make this a critical
opportunity for assistance. This Essay reviews the evidence on the resource
curse and its causes, including a prognosis for the long term consequences of
the present commodity booms, concluding that where behavior patterns to stay
unaltered the present booms would be a missed opportunity of quite
staggering proportions. The Essay then anatomizes the decision process by
which valuable natural resources in the territory of the society are harnessed
for economic growth that benefits the society, delineating five key decisions
and considering, for each, whether past failures were predominantly due to
mistakes or to misaligned incentives. Next, the Essay turns to the scope for
new international voluntary codes and discusses the potential need for new
laws, the national promulgation of which would be coordinated across the
OECD analogous to anti-bribery legislation. Such laws are difficult to
introduce and so are a last-resort approach for the realignment of incentives.
t Professor of Economics, University of Oxford; Fellow, St. Antony's College; Director,
Centre for the Study of African Economies.
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I. INTRODUCrION
The international community assigns a high priority to helping
impoverished societies, yet its efforts are currently lopsided. While it
spends around U.S. $ 100 billion on aid and the UN provides over 100,000
peacekeeping personnel, to date it has largely neglected the potential of
international codes and laws to raise standards of economic governance.'
This Essay analyzes the potential contribution of such codes and laws to
increase the development impact of natural resource revenues. The current
commodity booms make this a critical opportunity for assistance.
Developing countries that export resources are currently experiencing
booms unmatched since the 1970s. Many of these countries have been
impoverished and economically stagnant for decades and the booms
constitute extraordinary opportunities for development. The revenues are
often large enough to finance transformation, dwarfing aid flows.
However, the last global commodity boom of the 1970s largely failed to
deliver transformational development. On the contrary, its long-term
economic consequences were highly adverse. The failure to harness the
booms of the 1970s was the result of poor-governmental decision-making.
In many cases, the decision-makers would have arrived at different
decisions had they realized their consequences. But these decisions also
reflected divergences between the interests of the society and of the
decision-maker: the incentives facing the decision-maker were misaligned
with the social interest that the decision-maker was empowered to
represent. This distinction between mistakes and misaligned incentives is
fundamental. It is a guide to the actions that can prevent history from
repeating itself. Mistakes are to an extent self-correcting through learning,
whereas misaligned incentives require changed incentives. Codes may be
helpful in correcting both mistakes and misaligned incentives.
First, where past decisions were mistakes, international codes can be
helpful. The typical low-income commodity exporter has remained prone
to mistakes in economic policy because the cadre of well-trained decision-
makers within the society is still tiny. Adult populations are small, few
people get international graduate education, and few that do return to their
country; globalization is accelerating the emigration of the highly skilled.
Even among this limited pool, few are in positions of influence; the salaries
of senior civil servants have been radically eroded. Further, because the
adverse consequences of mistakes in managing commodity booms occur
only long after the decisions, it is easy for a society to misdiagnose its
problems. The typical mistake of the 1970s' booms was to intensify these
problems by borrowing and then consuming the proceeds. When
1. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 344 (2007), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/WD107frontmatter.pdf
(discussing aid); Background Note, U.N. Peacekeeping, U.N. Dep't Pub. Info., U.N.
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commodity prices crashed, this led to a phase of crisis management termed
"structural adjustment." Nigerians, for example, generally see the boom
period as the "good times," and blame their current poverty on "structural
adjustment." Thus, the process of learning from mistakes can usefully be
complemented by external guidance. This is where international codes can
be helpful. They get noticed, and they are official status signals that they
have been subject to a reasonably rigorous process of scrutiny and
assessment and so should be taken seriously. Even when such codes are
entirely voluntary, they can change behavior by speeding learning.
Where wrong decisions were the result of misaligned incentives rather
than mistakes, the incentives have to be changed. Although in principle,
incentives can be changed both by penalties and rewards, in the case of
decisions appertaining to resource revenues, the key changes are likely to
come from new penalties. This is because the private rewards for socially
costly decisions are usually too high to be countered by even higher
rewards for good decisions. The terrain of penalties opens up a role for the
law. Legal process is not the only means by which penalties can be
introduced, but it is likely to be a critical part of solutions.
In Part II, I review the evidence on the resource curse and its causes,
including a prognosis for the long-term consequences of the present
commodity booms should patterns of behavior stay unchanged. The key
conclusion from this section is that, were behavior patterns to stay
unaltered, the present booms would be a missed opportunity of quite
staggering proportions. The issue under discussion is undoubtedly the
single most important issue for the development of the countries now stuck
at the bottom of the global economy: the "bottom billion." In Part III, I
anatomize the decision process by which valuable natural resources are
harnessed for economic growth that benefits that resource-rich society. I
delineate five key decisions. For each I consider whether past failures were
predominantly due to mistakes or to misaligned incentives. In Part IV, I
turn to the scope for new international voluntary codes. Primarily, these
address those errors due to mistakes although they can also help to realign
incentives. In Part V, I turn to the potential need for new laws, the national
promulgation of which would be coordinated across the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") analogous to anti-
bribery legislation. Such laws are difficult to introduce and so are a last-
resort approach for the realignment of incentives.
II. THE RESOURCE CURSE AND ITS CAUSES: THE EVIDENCE
The "resource curse" refers to the tendency for many low-income
commodity exporters to experience slower economic growth than countries
that are less well-endowed with resources. The resource curse is evident
from particular situations, such as Nigeria since the discovery of oil; but as
a general proposition about commodity-exporting countries it has been
more controversial. 2  Counterexamples to Nigeria, such as the rapid
2. Richard M. Auty, Introduction and Overview, in RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC 3
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growth of Botswana since the discovery of diamonds, demonstrate that the
resource curse is not inevitable. Despite being landlocked and largely a
desert, Botswana has had one of the most rapidly growing economies in
the world.3 Further, there was an apparent discrepancy between two
different types of general (that is, statistical) evidence on the resource
curse. The main general evidence came from a study by Sachs and Warner,
which showed, using cross-section comparisons, that resource riches were
damaging.4 Cross-sections essentially compare the overall experience of
one country with another. Economists have, however, come to doubt such
evidence where it is used to investigate processes that occur over time,
because it is easy to misattribute to temporal processes what are in reality
underlying differences between countries.5 Evidently, the resource curse is
such a country-specific process: resources are discovered and this produces
various changes, which eventually damage the economy. These ubiquitous
suspicions of cross-section analysis appeared to be confirmed in the case of
the resource curse through time series analyses by Deaton and Miller6 and
Raddatz. 7 Time series analysis relies upon before-and-after situations in
each country and so is therefore better suited to temporal processes such as
the resource curse. They found that the consequences of a commodity
boom looked on average to be entirely benign on various economic
criteria.8 However, an acknowledged limitation of their method was that it
could only investigate the first few years following a boom. My own
recent work with Benedikt Goderis has reconciled this apparently
conflicting evidence.9 Using the statistical technique of co-integration we
are able to analyze both the short-term and the long-term effects of
commodity booms using data for virtually every country in the world, and
spanning the period 1970-2003. Our results confirm that in the first few
years, price booms benefit the overall economy.10 However, after about
twenty years the effects are often highly adverse. Simulating the current
commodity booms in the fourteen major African commodity exporters, we
find that the long-term effect is a reduction in output relative to the
counterfactual by around twenty-five percent.1' The resource curse is a
DEVELOPMENT 6 (Richard M. Auty ed., 2001).
3. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 190 (2007), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/ Resources/WDI07frontmatter.pdf.
4. Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, The Curse of Natural Resources, 45 EUR. ECON.
REV. 827 (2001).
5. Paul Collier & Benedikt Goderis, Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Natural Resource
Curse: Reconciling a Conundrum (Univ. of Oxford, Dept. Of Econ., Working Paper No.
WPS/2007-15, 2007).
6. Angus S. Deaton & Ronald I. Miller, International Commodity Prices, Macroeconomic
Performance, and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa (Princeton Stud. Int'l Fin., Study No. 79,
1995), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-ies/IES.Studies/S79.pdf.
7. Claudio Raddatz, Are External Shocks Responsible for the Instability of Output in Low-
Income Countries?, 84 J. DEV. ECON. 155 (2007).
8. Id.
9. Paul Collier & Benedikt Goderis, Prospects for Commodity Exporters: Hunky Dory or
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reality.
The adverse long-term effects are confined to price booms in non-
agricultural commodities. One explanation for this is that agricultural
booms accrue predominantly to farmers who usually use their windfalls
sensibly. In contrast, non-agricultural booms usually accrue
predominantly as government revenue. The current commodity booms are
non-agricultural, and we investigate whether such booms inevitably lead
to the resource curse or are themselves contingent. We find that they are
contingent upon initial conditions of governance: above a threshold level
there is no resource curse.' 2 Thus, for example, Norway has been able to
benefit from its oil not only in the short-term but has harnessed the
revenues for long-term growth. Our measure of governance is taken from
the International Country Risk Guide, a commercial rating agency. On this
measure, the threshold level below which the resource curse sets in is
approximately equivalent to the governance standards of Portugal in the
mid-1980s. At that time, Portugal was still suffering the aftermath of the
chaotic transition from dictatorship and consequently suffered sub-par
governance relative to the rest of Europe. Unfortunately, almost all of the
current commodity booms in low-income countries are occurring in
environments where governance is below this threshold. This emphasis
upon the importance of governance in the management of resource rents is
consistent with a recent analytic literature which models the political
economy of the resource curse.
13
Governance is, however, multifaceted, and, in one important
respect, it has manifestly improved in resource-exporting countries since
the 1970s. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a wave of
democratization. As a consequence, these resource-exporting countries are
now more democratic. With Anke Hoeffler, I have investigated whether
democracy improves the economic performance of resource-exporters. 14
We find that, whereas in other economies democracy has such an effect, in
the resource-exporters performance is significantly worse. In effect,
instead of democracy disciplining the decision process, the resource
revenues undermine the democratic process.'5 We decompose democracy
12. Id.
13. See Rabah Arezki & Frederick van der Ploeg, Can the Natural Resource Curse Be
Turned Into a Blessing? The Role of Trade Policies and Institutions (International Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/07/55, 2007) (examining conditions under which resource
booms can lead to increases in rent-seeking activity); Jean-Marie Baland & Patrick Francois,
Rent-Seeking and Resource Booms, 61 J. DEV. ECON. 527 (2000). See generally Roland Hodler, The
Curse of Natural Resources in Fractionalized Countries, 50 EUR. ECON. REV. 1367 (2006) (predicting
that natural resources lower incomes in fractionalized countries and increase income on
homogenous countries); Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, Institutions and the
Resource Curse, 116 ECON J. 1 (2006) (showing that the adoption of a more open trade policy
reduces the resource curse); James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik & Thierry Verdier, The Political
Foundations of the Resource Curse, 79 J. DEV. ECON. 447 (2006) (exploring political incentives
created by resource endowments to understand presence of a resource curse).
14. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Testing the Neocon Agenda: Democracy, Resource
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into two facets: electoral competition and checks and balances. The
economic damage done by democracy comes from electoral competition
and is offset if checks and balances are sufficiently strong. The instant
democracies of the 1990s have electoral competition without checks and
balances because the latter are much more difficult to establish. As Iraq
and Afghanistan demonstrate, elections can be introduced rapidly in any
society because they are brief events, and the incentives for parties to
participate are strong. In contrast, effective checks and balances are
continuous processes, and since their purpose is to limit power, the
powerful have little incentive to build them. An implication of this is that
the wave of democratization has not yet improved governance to the level
at which the incentives of decision-makers would be aligned with the
interests of citizens. Other approaches to the improvement of governance
within low-income resource-exporting countries are thus likely to be
critical to whether history repeats itself.
III. MISTAKES AND MISALIGNED INCENTIVES: FIVE KEY DECISION POINTS
The dismal outcome of commodity booms to date reflects either
mistakes or misaligned incentives, and in principle, either of these could
predominate in poorly governed countries. To analyze these two
possibilities, I focus on five decisions that are jointly critical in harnessing a
commodity boom for broader growth across the economy.
A. Decision 1: Negotiating the Resource Extraction Contract
In developing countries, resource extraction rights are invariably
vested in the government. 16 Because governments lack the organization,
skills and capital to undertake extraction themselves, it is appropriate to
sell these rights to resource extraction companies. The first critical decision
is how these sales should be conducted.
The government has one major advantage: it is usually the monopoly
seller of the nation's resources. The exception is where rebel organizations
control some of the national territory and in effect compete with the
government in selling rights. For example, this was for many years the
situation with respect to Angolan diamonds. When Jonas Savimbi, the
head of the Angolan rebel organization, was killed, an event which marked
the end of divided control of the nation's resources, the stock price of
resource extraction companies doing business in Angola fell on the New
York market by four percent.'7 Asset holders recognized that the move to
16. The American treatment of property rights over resource extraction is wholly
exceptional. In America the ownership of land confers the ownership of any resources found
under the land. In virtually all other countries extractable resources are regarded as the
property of the state. Typically, private companies purchase these rights through a
combination of pre-extraction lump sum payments such as 'signature bonuses' and royalty
payments on the flow of resources actually extracted, the terms of which can be varied from
time to time.
17. Massimo Guidolin & Eliana La Ferrara, Diamonds Are Forever, Wars Are Not: Is Conflict
[Vol. 11
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monopoly would worsen the bargaining position of companies and that
this would more than offset any material benefits of peace.
However, the government also has two major disadvantages: it has less
information than a resource extraction company as to the likely value of
extraction rights, and it has a more severe agency problem. The former
generates mistakes, whereas the latter generates misaligned incentives. As
a first step in reducing the information asymmetry, the government can
invest in a geological survey, so that the uncertainty over the value of the
rights is reduced. When good geological information is available, the next
and key step is an auction. An auction reveals value through competition
among informed companies: the government itself does not need to know
the value of the asset it is auctioning. The most celebrated instance of the
benefits of auctioning rights is the sale of the rights to the third generation
mobile phone network in the United Kingdom. The British Treasury was
about to sell the rights in a negotiated deal for £2 billion when it was
persuaded to rely upon an auction instead. The auction revealed a price of
£20 billion.18 If the British Treasury can so radically underestimate value, it
is evident that the typical African ministry of finance does not have the
core competence to negotiate satisfactory deals. The amount of
information revealed by an auction depends both upon the details of its
design and the integrity with which it is conducted. 9 I address this issue
below.
The agency problem facing governments arises from the fact that the
power to determine deals is delegated to some agent of government,
typically the minister of industry or the president, who might have a
different objective from that of the society. Resource extraction companies
thereby have the opportunity to arrive at a deal which is personally
rewarding for both the government agent and the company at the expense
of the society. Again, auctions are potentially the solution to this agency
problem. Auctions, however, can be easily gamed. To prevent this,
auctions would need to meet certain specified standards, and adherence to
these standards would in turn need to be monitored through a process of
international certification.
Currently, many African governments are entering into packaged
deals, usually with China, that combine resource extraction rights with
construction contracts.20  Such packaging has some organizational
advantages and is entirely compatible with an auction process: the auction
can specify that the government wants the package. Resource extraction
companies would then team up with construction companies and,
potentially in conjunction with their national aid agencies, submit a joint
bid. An advantage of this is that bids would then be comparable.
Bad for Private Firms?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1978, 1978 (2007).
18. John Kay, Cloud Cuckoo Land's Costly Logic, FIN. TIMEs, May 1, 2000, at 11.
19. For a discussion of a design appropriate for a resource auction, see Peter Cramton, The
Design of Auctions, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE (Jeffrey Sachs & Joseph Stglitz eds.,
2007).
20. See, e.g., Chen Aizhu & Lindsay Beck, Chinese-African Summit Yields $1.9 Billion in
Deals, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2006, at A17.
2008]
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B. Decision 2: Design Features of the Contract
The second critical decision concerns the specification of the rights that
the government proposes to sell. Extraction rights have three key
dimensions: their duration, the tax regime that will be applied, and the
credibility of these commitments. The third of these dimensions is the core
of the matter.
Because the government is sovereign, it can change the terms of any
deal that it strikes. This gives rise to a "time-consistency" problem: the
inability of the government to commit induces extraction companies to
discount its offer. The problem is far more acute for governments that start
with a weak reputation. This is normal across Africa. In this case, if the
government reneges, it suffers only a small loss of reputation. The problem
is particularly severe where no geological survey is available or planned, so
that the subsequent value of any rights to prospect for minerals will change
contingent upon discoveries. The government cannot credibly commit to
refrain from changing the terms of the deal should the company strike
lucky, and so the value of such a strike will be heavily discounted by the
company in the price it is prepared to pay for the right to prospect.
Nevertheless, the approach usually urged by international financial
agencies in such situations has been to encourage governments to offer
long-term contracts, and then, should companies strike lucky, to advise
governments not to renege on their terms.21  The intention is that
governments should gradually build their reputations to a point at which
their commitments would be credible. Such advice seems to be seriously
mistaken in two respects.
First, governments with poor reputations that offer long-term contracts
for highly speculative outcomes will only receive offers that include a
heavy discount for the likelihood that they will renege. In effect, the
company works on the assumption that the contract will be changed. If,
subsequently, the government fails to change the contract, it hands the
company a windfall in relation to the expected return. Conversely, if the
government indeed reneges on the contract, it incurs a loss of reputation,
which would not have occurred had it not made the commitment. The
alternative is for, the government to offer for sale only rights that extend
over a limited time horizon. It can further reduce the need to renege on a
contract by designing its tax system so as to be heavily geared to the level
of rents. Thus, fixed-fee royalties should be avoided. Taxation should start
only above some threshold world price at which the firm is making normal
profits and rise steeply as the price increases above that threshold. Both
features reduce the incentive for the government to renege on the contract
should the company strike lucky. They thereby increase the confidence of
the company that the terms of the contract will be respected, and so reduce
the discount that is built into its offer.
21. For example, the post-conflict government of Sierra Leone entered into resource
extraction contracts extending for up to seventeen years. Interview with Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah, former President of Sierra Leone, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (Jan. 21, 2007).
[Vol. 11
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However, the key reason why this common advice is ignored is that
the incentives for governments already tempt them to offer contracts with
horizons that are too long and tax regimes that are too generous. By
designing contracts in this way, governments increase current revenues at
the expense of revenues in the future, when the current group of ministers
may not be in power. This misalignment of incentives is at its most acute
in transitional governments, which are common in post-conflict situations.
For example, the transitional government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo knew that many of its members would be out of government after
the post-conflict elections, scheduled for 2006. In the preceding three years,
long-term rights to mineral extraction were sold off under a very generous
tax regime. During 2006, mineral exports are estimated to have been
around U.S. $ 200 million whereas royalty payments received into the
government budget were a mere U.S. $ 86,000. The prices at which these
rights were sold were inevitably heavily discounted by the lack of
credibility of the regime's commitments. Similarly, while it was still a rebel
organization, the current government of Congo Brazzaville is believed to
have sold the French oil company, Elf, the long-term right to oil at a
heavily discounted price in return for financial support in its subsequently
successful military struggle. Analytically, these sales of extraction rights
were equivalent to incurring international debt at very high interest rates,
something that would not have been permitted by the international
community.
The appropriate specification of the rights to be sold thus depends
upon political as well as geological considerations. While a mine might
have a natural life of thirty years it will often be economically
disadvantageous for the society to sell extraction rights that extend over
such a long time horizon. It may be preferable to incur the extra
transaction costs implied by rights that are shorter than the natural life of
the investment.
C. Decision 3: Transparency in Revenues
The third critical decision is the degree to which revenues are
scrutinized. Until the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI),
which began in 2002, revenues paid to governments by resource extraction
companies were usually confidential. 22 This lack of disclosure gave rise to
two abuses: one by companies, and the other by government officials.
Most revenue-receiving governments have little capacity to scrutinize
whether payments by companies are fully compliant with tax regimes.
However, once payments are made public, companies are potentially
exposed to a greater degree of scrutiny and are more likely to be
voluntarily compliant. Government officials abuse the lack of disclosure by
improperly diverting to personal uses payments, which should properly
22. Extractive Indus. Transparency Initiative, EITI Summary,
http://eitransparency.org/eiti/summary (last visited May 16, 2008).
20081
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accrue to the government budget. Indeed, the key impetus for the EITI was
evidence from the IMF that some U.S. $ 2 billion in oil revenues that should
have accrued to the Angolan budget were missing. The scrutiny of
government by citizens depends upon information. This is exemplified by
the results of the decision of the Nigerian Federal Government to
implement the EITI at the level of the thirty-six states within the federation,
which among them receive half of the oil revenue.23 The Federal Ministry
of Finance decided to publish in the newspapers the monthly oil revenues
sent to states and handled by state governors. On the day of first
publication, newspaper circulation in Nigeria spiked: citizens wanted to
hold their officials accountable. The benefits of the EITI already extend
beyond Africa: it has substantially improved the management of resource
revenues in Russia and central Asia.
24
An even more fundamental abuse of resource revenues is when they
do not accrue to the government in any form, but are instead paid by
companies directly to rebels, who control part of the national territory.
This was, for example, the case for many years with diamonds sold by the
very large Angolan rebel organization, UNITA, headed by Jonas Savimbi.
25
The international community to notice of this problem at around the same
time as the establishment of the EITI, through the Kimberley Process, a
voluntary system of certification of the provenance of diamonds. 26 This
process has already proved highly successful in curtailing rebel access to
the world diamond market, and the effectiveness of its scrutiny is steadily
increasing. The system is also being considered for a few other high-value
commodities, such as coltan.
The opacity of resource revenues and their theft by rebel groups are
not mistakes. Evidently, they are the result of misaligned incentives:
opacity and theft benefit those who misappropriate resource revenues.
D. Decision 4: the Aggregate Savings Decision
By far the most important decision point concerns the proportion of
resource revenues that should be saved. Resource extraction is a depletion
of an asset, and so needs to be offset by asset accumulation out of income.
This implies that the savings rate out of resource revenues should be
radically higher than that out of more sustainable sources of income. This
difference in savings rates in turn affords major scope for mistakes. There
are two distinct time frames that need to be taken into account in reaching
the savings decision: one long-term, and the other medium-term.
The long-term time frame concerns depletion. The extraction of non-
23. Olusegun Adeniyi, Revenue Disclosure in Nigeria, available at
eitidev.forumone.com/UserFiles/adenyispeech.pdf. See also Nigeria, Candidate Country,
http://eittransparency.org/ Nigeria (last visited May 16, 2008).
24. Interview with Eric Bergof, Chief Economist, European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, in Budapest (Aug. 29, 2007).
25. Guidolin & La Ferrara, supra note 17, at 1986.
26. See, e.g., Kimberley Process, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/faqs/index-en.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
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agricultural natural resources depletes the stock of the asset. To maintain
the overall value of assets, some of the resource depletion should be offset
by an accumulation of other assets. The proportion that should be saved
depends upon the likely length of life of the resource and upon the likely
rate of return on investment relative to the rate of return earned by leaving
the resources in the ground. But, in general, a significant proportion of
revenues from resource extraction will need to be saved in order to avoid
overall depletion of assets.
The medium-term time frame concerns the price cycle of the
commodity. The world prices of commodities have a long record of
substantial fluctuation. While there is nothing so predictable as a genuine
"cycle," there are periods when prices are sufficiently out of line with their
long-term average level that it is reasonable to expect a degree of reversion
towards the long-term mean. There are good reasons why a government
might try to smooth its expenditures rather than simply let expenditure
track these extreme fluctuations in revenue. Volatility in expenditures
gives rise to inefficiencies. For example, during periods of high
expenditure, commitments are made to rather low-return investments,
which can then only be financed during periods of low expenditure
through deep cuts in investments, which should have been prioritized.
Both offsetting depletion and smoothing the price cycle require the
government to save part of the revenue from resource extraction. This
decision to save is subject to a further "time-consistency" problem.
Consider the decision of a prudent finance minister whether to save
revenue. The saving necessarily defers the spending decision to the future,
a time when the minister responsible is likely to be different. If this future
finance minister is also prudent, then no issue arises. However, consider
the consequences if the future finance minister is "populist." Populism is
the term used to describe politicians who attempt to build support by
advocating strategies that are superficially appealing but too simplistic to
be viable-a political stance which is likely to be common when the
electorate has little education.
The hallmark of such strategies is to sacrifice the future for the present.
The liquid assets accumulated through saving the resource revenues are
thus vulnerable to the political strategy of converting them rapidly into
consumption. In this case the revenues saved by the prudent finance
minister are simply handed to the populist finance minister to spend. Let
us suppose that not only do prudent finance ministers prioritize savings
more highly than populist ministers, but that the quality of their spending
is higher. Thus, the prudent finance minister faces a dilemma. If there is a
significant risk that there will be a future populist finance minister, then
the current prudent finance minister may reasonably decide that the best
course of action is not to save the revenue, even though savings would
otherwise be warranted. This is a form of time inconsistency problem
because future governments would be better off if only they could tie their
hands, renouncing the freedom of a future populist minister to misspend
the savings of the current prudent minister. If they renounced this
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freedom, the prudent minister would save and this would make a future
government better off, whether or not the minister was populist. But if the
future government retains this freedom, then it cannot benefit from it.
Evidently, a future government cannot itself renounce its freedom because
it does not yet exist. However, the present government can act on behalf of
the future government by establishing a fiscal constitution. By this I mean
a constitutional provision that enshrines some basic principles of the
savings decision, curtailing the freedom of a future populist minister of
finance to deplete assets.
In the absence of a fiscal constitution, the decision of a prudent finance
minister not to save windfall resource revenues is not necessarily a
mistake. Rather, it is the consequence of misaligned incentives. Several
resource-rich governments have now recognized the need to realign
incentives by introducing a fiscal constitution. For example, the
governments of Chile and Nigeria have both recently enacted such
provisions to handle the depletion and price swings of their commodity
exports, copper and oil respectively. 27  Constitutions can always be
overturned. However, the process of overturning them is both public and
slow. These obstacles might well be sufficient to deter a populist minister
from even attempting to deplete assets: by definition, a populist finance
minister is in a hurry. In making the populist option more difficult, the
fiscal constitution also reduces the returns to becoming a populist minister
of finance and thereby makes populism less likely.
E. Decision 5: the Public Investment Decision
Having determined the proportion of resource revenues to be saved,
the government must then decide which assets to acquire. Specifically, it
must decide how much of the savings should be held abroad and, for the
savings invested domestically, which investments should be chosen. There
are two distinct reasons for saving abroad. One is that those savings
intended to smooth consumption over the price cycle need to be held in
liquid form so that they can be depleted during the unpredictable periods
of low prices. Hence, they have to be held in foreign financial assets.
Domestic financial assets, though liquid at the level of an individual
holding, are merely claims on illiquid investments within the society and
so cannot in aggregate be liquidated. In addition, at some point the return
on domestic investment is liable to drop below that available on world
markets and at this point it is better to hold savings temporarily abroad
27. See Remi Babalola, Improving Fiscal Coordination Between the Federal and State
Government (Oct. 3, 2007),
http://www.fmf.gov.ng/portal/uploads/fies/DFID-fisca%20respnsibiity%2bi.pdf
(discussing fiscal responsibility legislation in Nigeria); Heather Walsh & James Attwood, In
Chile, the Richest Latin American Country, Government Approval Has Dropped, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Nov. 7, 2007, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/06/bloomberg/bxcopper.php (discussing the
resulting pressures of populism in Chile).
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until conditions within the economy permit them to be switched into
domestic investment. This is termed "absorptive capacity." The rate of
return on domestic investment is influenced by many factors. Particularly
pertinent is that during savings-driven investment booms, returns are
driven down by both the congestion at the planning stage and rising
construction costs at the implementation stage. It is usually more efficient
to stretch the domestic investment of the savings generated by a
commodity boom over a longer period than the commodity boom itself.
Complementing these macroeconomic considerations about absorptive
capacity are microeconomic concerns about the selection of public
investment projects. For a project to be satisfactory it should meet two
criteria: honesty and efficiency. These aspects of the project need to be
assessed prior to approval. An effective public investment process should
thus subject all proposed projects to these two tests. Dishonesty in public
investment procurement is a massive problem in resource-rich countries.
The minimal defense against it is to require all projects to be subject to
competitive tendering. Since it is easy to subvert competitive tendering, as
with auctions, there needs to be some scrutiny of the process backed by
certification that the tendering process meets reasonable standards. For
example, a common way in which competitive tendering is subverted is
when public officials in charge of procurement agree in advance with a
particular firm that once it has been awarded the contract the government
will change the specification in such a way as to warrant re-pricing. A
contract to build schools might be recalled in order to change the design of
the buildings and the alterations accepted at a price higher than is
warranted. While there is indeed a genuine need to be able to adjust
contracts, since the adjustments are not re-tendered, there is scope for
abuse and so the process needs to be policed. Honesty is not enough.
Some of the most egregious public investments of resource revenues would
have been disastrous even if their implementation had been completely
honest because they were foolishly conceived. The defense against this
process has to be technocratic: the likely rate of return on projects has to be
estimated in an impartial manner, with only those projects that offer
returns over some threshold set around the rate of return on assets held
abroad being approved. This was in essence the decision process that
enabled Botswana to convert diamond revenues into record growth.28 The
evaluation of public investment projects is standard in developed
countries, but it is also a process that is readily gamed. Because future
returns are inevitably hypothetical, it is invariably feasible to manipulate
estimates to suit political demands. Hence, again there is a need for
scrutiny and certification of the process.
The tendency to use the revenues accruing during commodity booms
for surges in poorly selected public investment is, to an extent, a mistake.
However, it also reflects misaligned incentives. Whenever public
procurement processes and the scrutiny of rates of return are weak, there
are large personal gains to be had from maximizing the current flow of
28. Charles Harvey, Botswana: Is the Economic Miracle Over?, 1 J. AFR. ECON. 335 (1992). 13
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public investment projects. Indeed, since many of the kickbacks accrue
upon commissioning the project, there is an incentive to commission far
more projects than can be implemented, resulting in the common spectacle
of projects that stand uncompleted for many years while new ones start up
around them. Thus, the core problem is less a matter of mistakes than of
misaligned incentives.
IV. THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY CODES
Recall that our starting point is the current commodity boom against
the backdrop of the dismal history of the resource curse. History must not
be repeated, but it will be repeated unless there is an appropriate
combination of learning to correct past mistakes, and institutional
innovation to correct misaligned incentives. I now consider to what extent
voluntary codes can be useful in facilitating both learning and the
realignment of incentives.
Manifestly, voluntary codes can be powerful instruments. The EITI
and the Kimberley Process are both important examples of how voluntary
codes can improve resource extraction. The former has demonstrated that
it is possible by voluntarism to increase financial transparency, and the
latter that it is possible to regulate the trade in commodities. To what
extent can this approach usefully be extended?
Voluntary codes have power for four core reasons. Their basic
rationale is informational. The code simply codifies good practice and
thereby informs governments as to what is generally considered sensible.
The codification helps to distinguish this particular advice from the babble
of advice, often contradictory, to which governments are subjected.
Governments can respect codified advice because they infer that it has been
subject to thorough and impartial analysis. For instance, in banking,
voluntary international standards are already so well developed that they
can be taken for granted. The Basel Standards, generated under the
auspices of the Bank for International Settlements and periodically revised
by agreement, guide the international banking industry as to prudential
somewhat imperfect standards.29 Standards of prudential banking exist,
whereas those for resource extraction do not, not because the banking
industry is an easier sector in which to get agreement, but because the
absence of such standards could produce systemic dangers with enormous
costs for important governments. While the costs of the absence of
standards in the management of natural resource revenues are also
enormous, they are borne by people without the power of international
action.
The informational role, however, is probably not the most potent
aspect of codes. Even though in all badly governed resource-rich societies
there are reformers anxious to critique poor policies, the reformers
29. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
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themselves face a coordination problem: each voice for reform is also, often
inadvertently, a voice for self-promotion. Reform is a highly politicized
process and so it is part of the struggle for power. Thus, due to personal
rivalry, it is often difficult for reformers to coordinate around an agreed set
of objectives. A code has the advantage of providing a neutral goal around
which reformers can rally. It is both easier to get pressure for adoption and
easier to defend, once adopted, than any personalized reform. The
Nigerian reforms of 2003-2006 provide a good illustration. When Ngozi
Nkonjo-Iweala became Minister of Finance in Nigeria in 2003, despite the
oil boom, the Federal Government was running a fiscal deficit.30 She
rapidly turned the budget into surplus, but recognized that such surpluses
needed to be institutionalized into a savings rule. Otherwise, her fiscal
prudence would merely transfer to some imprudent successor, the
prospect of which in the Nigerian context was not inconsiderable. In the
absence of any international guidelines she devised her own standards and
attempted to enshrine them in domestic legislation. Unfortunately, the
resulting Fiscal Responsibility Bill provoked major opposition on
constitutional grounds and failed to get enacted during the term of office of
President Obasanjo. Indeed, in 2003, a year prior to the end of his term, the
President removed Dr. Nkonjo-Iweala from her position. For the present,
the rule continues to be observed, but its status remains informal. It is, in
effect, "the Ngozi rule," yet she is no longer even a resident of Nigeria.
31
While the rule may yet become anchored in legislation, it would surely be
more robust were it to have the force of an international standard like the
EITI, which Dr. Nkonjo-Iweala also adopted.
Voluntary codes also provide a norm for the coordination of external
pressure. Adherence to the EITI rapidly became a condition for some
donor assistance; powerful financial incentives need a clear benchmark but
not necessarily one that has the force of law. The adoption of the
Kimberley Process became a benchmark for NGO pressure. The pressure
was first used to induce the governments of diamond-producing nations to
sign the standard. Then pressure shifted to strengthening the systems of
verification and enforcement.
Perhaps most importantly, codes separate the sheep from the goats. By
revealing those governments that are willing to comply with a particular
set of standards, they also reveal those that are not. There is a strong
incentive for governments not to reveal themselves as being in the latter
category. A dramatic instance of this phenomenon was the creation of the
Euro, something initially intended so that France could have a common
currency with Germany. Once Spain announced that it intended to meet
the criteria for membership, Italy and Portugal felt compelled to do the
same, which in turn forced the Greek government to meet the criteria.
Similarly, the Kimberley Process, though voluntary, has rapidly attracted
30. Bright Okogu & Philip Osafo-Kwaako, Issues in Fiscal Policy Management Under the
Economic Reforms, in ECONOMIC POLICY OPTIONS FOR A PROSPEROUS NIGERIA 2003-2007 (Paul
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every diamond-producing country in the world. Taking into consideration
the five critical decision points discussed in Section III, only the third is
currently covered by an international code. Thus, all of the other four have
potential for being codified.. One new code could cover the design and conduct of auctions. The
rights to oil exploration are now usually, but not invariably, sold through
auction. The exceptions tend to be for exploration rights in countries that
have not previously had a resource extraction industry, for instance the
discovery of oil in Northern Uganda in 2007.32 The most likely explanation
is the sheer unfamiliarity of these governments with the oil industry.
There is no particular technological reason why non-oil rights of extraction
cannot be auctioned using the principles currently applied in the oil
industry. The high world price of virtually all minerals ensures that there
would be a ready supply of bidders. However, an auction is only as robust
as the way in which it is conducted: auctions can be rigged in a variety of
ways. Hence, any voluntary code needs to be reinforced by a verification
system, just as the Kimberley Process is supported by a verification system.
Fortunately, because an auction is a discrete event, it would be far easier to
verify than the Kimberley Process, which has to monitor the continuing
activity of diamond extraction. International verification would need to be
performed by some agency, which might also provide advice on the
detailed conduct of the auction best suited for the rights. The verification
role could either be assigned to the new EITI agency, thereby expanding its
role, or to one of the international financial institutions.
A second code could cover the specification of the time horizon of any
extraction rights and some parameters for the tax regime. One important
rule of thumb is that rights should not extend beyond the horizon of
reasonable political certainty, because otherwise their value will be deeply
discounted. A second is that the tax regime should be sufficiently
aggressive that the bulk of revenues accrue from taxation, rather than from
the initial sale of rights. Otherwise, the government that sells the rights is,
in effect, borrowing from future governments at a very high rate of interest.
An important specific part of the code might limit the powers of
transitional governments to mortgage the future in this way.
A third code could cover the savings rate out of resource revenues.
What is required here is guidance rather than legislation. However, this is
the single most important step in whether resource revenues are harnessed.
Further, the issue is sufficiently complex and subject to populist pressures
that decisions are liable to go wrong. Some governments, such as that of
East Timor, are attracted to the Norwegian model of financial asset
accumulation in its Government Pension Fund, 33 which is surely
inappropriate for capital-scarce low-income countries, while others are
32. Interview with Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile, Governor of the Central Bank of
Uganda, Government of Uganda, in Kampala, Uganda (Sept. 2007).
33. See Norway's Sovereign Fund Serving As Model, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2007, at C7
(discussing efforts to evaluate Norway's sovereign wealth funds, which reinvest the proceeds
from the sale state-owned oil and gas assets).
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simply failing to save at all.34 What is required are some guidelines linked
to analysis undertaken by an authoritative and neutral agency. The
analysis would, for example, show how the optimal savings rate is linked
to the length of time until the resource is likely to be depleted, and to
whether the current world price looks to be above or below that which is
expected to prevail. The guidelines introduce the concept of an
appropriate savings rate out of depleting resource revenues, and would
point to this analysis as a way for both the key decision-makers within the
government, and the less well-defined group that would constitute an
informed society, to form a judgment on a reasonable range for the savings
rate given its particular circumstances. The recent discoveries of oil in
Ghana and Uganda hit the national press in each country without being
framed by the policy choice with which the society was confronted. 35 An
international standard could have provided local journalists with a way of
posing the key savings issue, which necessarily arose for the society.
A fourth code could cover the procedures for public investment.
Unlike the other decision points, the procedures needed for effective
investment are not specific to resource revenues. Procedures that, are in
any case desirable, become critical. Those procedures that concern
honesty, most especially competitive tendering for procurement, are
routine, although not always observed. When the reforming Nigerian
government of 2003-2006 established a unit for competitive tendering of
public investment projects under Oby Ezekwesili, the cost of the typical
project fell by an astonishing forty to fifty percent.36  While most
governments appreciate the case for systems to reinforce honesty in
projects, they have less appreciation of the importance and difficulty of
efficiency: in order to harness a resource windfall the chosen projects must
have a good rate of return. This is a technical matter, requiring a unit, most
appropriately assigned to the finance ministries. The technocrats staffing
such units would need protection from politicians pressuring to massage
expected rates of return in order to flatter those projects that were
politically favored. As with auctions, this calls for a system of verification.
If assessments were subject to international verification, local technocrats
would have a ready defense against illegitimate pressure. The natural
place to lodge such a unit would be the World Bank, since the estimate of
rate of return on public investment projects is part of its core business.
If these codes are to be promulgated some entity needs to be
responsible for them. The precedents for the promulgation of voluntary
codes suggest that various approaches can be effective. Many codes of
economic behavior have been promulgated by the IMF and are part of its
34. For data on the growth of sovereign wealth funds-state-owned accumulations of
financial assets for investment purposes, see Gerald Lyons, State Capitalism: The Rise of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, 14 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 179 (2007).
35. Id.; Interview with Dr. Paul Acquah, Governor of the Central Bank of Ghana,
Government of Ghana, in Accra, Ghana (July 31, 2007).
36. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, The Economic Costs of Corruption in Infrastrucure, in
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annual Article IV consultation process in which all its member-
governments are required to participate. The Kimberley Process is run by
public-private partnership between the diamond industry, NGOs, and
diamond-producing governments. The EITI, which started as an NGO
campaign, was first adopted by the British Government. It was then
tentatively and temporarily assigned to the international financial
institutions and has now become an official international organization
headquartered in Oslo. Which agencies would be most appropriate as the
codifiers of the four proposed new codes?
It would clearly be both more effective and more practical to lodge the
new codes with existing agencies rather than attempt to create new ones.
The four codes naturally cluster into two pairs. The first two, on auctions
and the specification of mineral rights, are both concerned with
transparency in resource revenues. The other two, on the savings decision
and the processes of public investment, both concern the conduct of
budgets. The first pair is close to the existing mandate of the EITI and
would most naturally be situated there. The second pair, concerning
budgets, belongs most naturally with the IMF and the World Bank. The
IMF is indeed already advising governments on savings out of resource
windfalls, and codification would be a sensible development of this work.
Similarly, the World Bank routinely undertakes Public Expenditure
Reviews, and specific guidelines on processes of public investment for
resource-rich low-income countries would again be a natural extension of
this work.
Independent international verification and certification are now
standard in many areas of economic activity. The new codes would
require two distinct systems of verification, one concerning the conduct of
auctions and the other the conduct of public investment. The core rationale
for each of them is that a government needs to be able to demonstrate to its
citizens that it is in compliance with its own stated commitments. The
governments that are most in need of this capacity to enhance their
credibility are those with poor reputations that are attempting to reform.
Hence, the provision of verification and certification is not a quasi-police
operation intended to force compliance upon an otherwise recalcitrant
government. Rather, it would enable those governments that were
genuinely committed to reform to reveal their type. As such governments
revealed their type, corrupt governments would be revealed by default,
and this would facilitate pressure for change within their societies.
Reforming elements would be able to ask why their governments had
chosen not to comply with international norms that other governments had
adopted.
V. THE ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law is so difficult to get enacted that it must be used very
sparingly. Is there a real need for the promulgation of new international
law regarding resource extraction? The one area where new law might be
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pertinent is to reinforce the voluntary code on auctions by requiring those
resource extraction companies based in the OECD, an international
organization for policy coordination and implementation among
industrialized economies, to enter into new contracts only through certified
auctions of extraction rights. Would this be desirable, and is it feasible?
The close analogy to such a law is the anti-bribery laws, which were
adopted across the OECD in a coordinated process orchestrated by that
body. It was important for these laws to be coordinated since no single
country was prepared to disadvantage its own businesses vis-A-vis those of
other countries, by enacting a law individually.
What would be the consequences of such a pan-OECD law? One
possible consequence would be that the governments of resource-exporting
countries would not adopt certified auctions, and as a result, China would
capture the pool of resource extraction contracts. However, this is not a
likely outcome. Once the law is adopted, a government that decides to sell
extraction rights through a non-auction process would know that a key
group of potential purchasers would thereby be excluded. In effect, the
decision would hand monopsony power to China and thereby manifestly
disadvantage the country. It is one thing doing deals with China when the
government has many alternatives, and quite another to choose to put
oneself in such a disadvantageous position. Obviously, by holding an
auction, a government would not in any way preclude selling the
extraction rights to the Chinese. Hence, within resource-rich countries,
there would be strong pressure to preserve competition for the purchase of
resources by adopting auctions.
If, as a result of the legislation, auctions became standard, then the
OECD countries would benefit. At present, sales are often conducted in an
opaque manner. This is sometimes tantamount to a competition in the
degree of corruption that the bidder can countenance, and sometimes a
competition in which China can supplement its offer through aid, but
OECD companies cannot.
Laws involve penalties for breaches. However, the court-inflicted
penalties need not be severe because the power of deterrence in this case is
likely to come predominantly from citizens, both as consumers and as
employees. No significant OECD-based resource extraction company
could afford to acquire concessions for resource extraction through
processes, which clearly breached of the law. In effect, much of the power
of the law here comes from the information signal conveyed by the
detection of a breach. Consumers and employees know to penalize
companies that act illegally. Consumers boycott products, employees
complain, and, perhaps most importantly, the best potential recruits look
elsewhere.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current commodity booms constitute the most important
opportunity for development that low-income commodity exporters have
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ever had. Yet, if history repeats itself, this opportunity will be missed. In
these countries, aid has limited potency: their governments are sometimes
already awash with revenue. A neglected type of assistance, which might
be more helpful, is the promulgation of voluntary codes and laws
specifically designed to improve the economic governance of resource
rents. For resource-rich countries, improving economic governance is of
the essence. In this Essay, I have suggested how new codes and laws could
address both the mistakes and the misaligned incentives that lead
inexorably to the resource curse. Difficult as these new codes and laws
would be to promulgate, the costs are trivial both relative to the scale of
existing development assistance and to the likely beneficial effects.
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